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Misrepresentation inthe
Sale of Stock:
Which Buyers are Protected?

Case

by J. William Hicks

J. William Hicks is the
C. Ben Dutton Professor
of Law at Indiana University
School of Law, Third Street and
IndianaAvenue, Bloomington,
IN 47405; (812) 855-3844,
and the author of the
two-volume treatise "Civil
Liabilities and Enforcement
Under the 1933 Act" (Clark
Boardman CallaghanSecurities
Law Series, rev'd ed. 1994).

ISSUE
Does Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 extend to a privately
negotiated sale of stock?
FACTS
Arthur Gustafson, Daniel McLean,
and Francis Butler (collectively the
"Gustafson Group"), were the sole
shareholders of Alloyd Company,
Inc. ("Alloyd"), a manufacturer
of clear plastic blister packaging
and automatic heat seal packaging
equipment. In May 1989, the
Gustafson Group decided to sell
Alloyd and engaged KPMG Peat
Marwick ("Peat Marwick"), a national accounting firm, to locate a buyer
Peat Marwick prepared a detailed
profile of Alloyd in order to solicit
prospective buyers.
Wind Point Partners II ("Wind
Point"), an experienced and sophisticated investment partnership,
received a copy of the profile. In

August 1989, after conducting extensive due diligence regarding Alloyd,
visiting Alloyd's facility, and interviewing key Alloyd executives, Wind
Point submitted a written proposal
to purchase Alloyd by buying the
stock held by the Gustafson Group.
The Gustafson Group agreed to sell
Alloyd to Alloyd Holdings, Inc.
("Holdings"), a corporation formed
by Wind Point to effectuate the
purchase.
Two members of the Gustafson
Group, McLean and Butler, invested
in Holdings and, together with three
other individuals and Wind Point,
became its shareholders. McLean
and Butler also became officers and
directors of the new company.
Prior to signing the Stock Purchase
Agreement at the closing of the
transaction on December 20, 1989,
Wind Point attempted to learn as
much as it could about Alloyd's business and financial condition. It
retained Peat Marwick to help in this
(Continued on page 97)
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at a
Glance
This case concerns the
civil liability of persons
who misrepresent material facts in a privately
negotiated sale of securities. The Supreme Court
will decide whether
Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933
provides a buyer of
securities with a right
to rescind the purchase
both in public and
private offerings.

endeavor. Peat Marwick provided
Wind Point with information about
Alloyd's inventory but, because
Alloyd took inventory only at the
end of each year, the inventory
information was based on estimates
of the cost of goods sold and of gross
profits. The parties discussed the
appropriateness of taking a physical
inventory but, ultimately, closed
their agreement without having
taken a physical audit.
At the closing of the transaction,
Holdings acquired all of Alloyd's
stock for approximately $18.7 million plus $2.1 million to reflect an
estimate of Alloyd's increase in net
worth from December 31, 1988,
through the closing. A provision in
the Stock Purchase Agreement
required that after the year-end
audit of Alloyd's financial statements, sellers or buyers would remit
an appropriate amount to cover any
variance between the estimated
change in Alloyd's net worth for
1989 and the actual change.
By February 8, 1990, McLean, who
by then had become president of
Holdings, learned that Alloyd's actual earnings and net book value for
1989 were significantly lower than
the estimates relied upon by Wind
Point in making its offer to buy
Alloyd. This variance was attributed
to the fact that Alloyd's year-end
inventory was significantly lower
than the estimates provided by the
Gustafson Group to Wind Point.
After confirming the discrepancy,
McLean informed Wind Point of the
inventory shortfall. Later, the
Gustafson Group paid $815,000 plus
interest to Holdings pursuant to the
adjustment provision in the Stock
Purchase Agreement.
On February 11, 1991, Wind Point
and Holdings sued the Gustafson
Group in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. They asserted two claims: 1)

violation of Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
771(2)("Section 12(2)") and 2)
breach of the representations and
warranties made in the Stock
Purchase Agreement.
Both sides conducted extensive discovery and filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. (See Glossary
for the definition of summary judgment.) On May 29, 1992, the district
court entered an unpublished order
granting the Gustafson Group's
motion for summary judgment. In
ruling for the Gustafson Group, the
district court relied heavily on the
reasoning of the Third Circuit in
Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker,
925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), which
held that Section 12(2) applies only
to initial offerings by a company and
not to subsequent trading by
security holders.
Wind Point and Holdings appealed
to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. In an unpublished order,
the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and sent the case
back to the district court for further
proceedings in light of the Seventh
Circuit's recent decision in Pacific
Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen &
Co., 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993),
which concluded that Section 12(2)
was not limited to initial offerings.
The Gustafson Group responded to
this setback by filing a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court
seeking review of the Seventh
Circuit's action, which the Court
granted.
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 (the "1933 Act" or the "Act")
creates an expansive civil remedy
for misrepresentations made by sellers of securities. It provides that any
person who sells, or offers to sell, a
security "by means of a written
prospectus or oral communication"

that contains materially misleading
statements is liable to the purchaser
of the security.
Until the late 1980s, most attorneys
and courts did not question that
Section 12(2) applied to all fraudulent sales of securities - those sales
by a company when the securities
were originally distributed to the
public as well as to those sales by
security holders when the securities
were traded privately or through
broker-dealers in public markets.
Recently, however, several federal
district courts and two federal appellate courts have invoked a restrictive
reading of Section 12(2) to deny protection to buyers of securities in private resale transactions and to customers of broker-dealer firms seeking relief against allegedly fraudulent
conduct of individual brokers. See
Ballay, 925 F.2d 682, and First
Union Discount Brokerage Serv. v.
Milos, 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1993)
(both courts reading Section 12(2)
as applying only to the original public offering of a security). The only
other federal appellate court to
address the issue squarely, the
Seventh Circuit, determined, as
noted above, that Section 12(2) does
apply to resales of securities. Pacific
Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 582.
In this case, the Supreme Court will
resolve this conflict and, in doing so,
will decide the scope of protection
afforded to buyers of securities
under Section 12(2). The issue raises questions regarding the language
and structure of the 1933 Act, the
purpose of the statute, legislative
history, and public policy.
Both sides agree that the starting
point in every case involving statutory construction is the statutory language. However, as sellers in a private resale transaction, the
Gustafson Group argues that the language of Section 12(2), especially
the term prospectus, indicates that
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Congress intended the remedy to
apply to public, not private, sales of
stock. The term is defined broadly in
Section 2(10) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 77b(10) ("Section
2(10)"), but this definition is explicitly withdrawn where "the context
otherwise requires." Not surprisingly, the Gustafson Group contends
that the context for this term in
Section 12(2) is public distributions
of newly created securities by
corporate issuers.
The Supreme Court has recognized
that the 1933 Act was "primarily
concerned with the regulation of
new offerings." United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979). Given
this legislative objective as demonstrated in the legislative history, the
Gustafson Group contends that
Congress used the term prospectus
in Section 12(2) in its usual and customary sense, i.e., as a reference to a
document that solicits public investors to purchase securities. Furthermore, they see this construction as
entirely consistent with the 1933
Act's liability scheme which, in their
opinion, is limited to public offerings.
In contrast, Wind Point and Holdings
argue that the terms prospectus and
oral communication in Section 12(2)
are unambiguous and that, under
rules of statutory construction
employed by the Court, the plain
meaning of the provision controls
without any need to examine the legislative history. King v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 112 S.Ct. 570, 575 n. 14
(1991), quoting Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981).
Wind Point and Holdings stress the
broad definition of the term prospectus in Section 2(10), noting that it is
not limited to primary offerings.
Although the statutory definition of
the term prospectus is qualified by
the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires," Wind Point and
Holdings assert that there is nothing

unusual about resales, public or
private, that warrants a restrictive
application of Section 2(10) in the
context of the liability for misrepresentations established by Section
12(2). Moreover, argue Wind Point
and Holdings, the language of
Section 12(2) does not limit its
application to fraud in connection
with initial distributions of securities. According to Wind Point and
Holdings, the absence of ambiguity
in the definition of prospectus
means that the profile and the
Stock Purchase Agreement each
constituted a prospectus within the
meaning of Section 12(2). This
result, they urge, is consistent with a
major goal of the 1933 Act - the
protection of all purchasers against
misrepresentation in public and
private transactions.
Legislative history is frequently
helpful in determining the meaning
of statutory terms and provisions.
In this case, both sides rely on it,
despite the fact that the legislative
history of Section 12 is sparse at
best. Pinterv. Dahl, 486 U.S.
622 (1988).
The Gustafson Group invokes the
legislative history of the 1933 Act
to demonstrate that the primary
concern of Congress was the regulation of public securities offerings and
infers from that history that Section
12(2) should have a consistent purpose. Wind Point and Holdings, on
the other hand, argue that the
silence of the legislative history as
to Section 12(2) justifies a literal
interpretation of the provision, a
construction that protects all buyers
regardless of the nature of the
transaction.
It is appropriate for the Court to
address public policy considerations
involved in the construction of
Section 12(2). Pinter,486 U.S. at
653. On this point, the Gustafson
Group offers several arguments in

support of its narrow reading of
Section 12(2). First, the Gustafson
Group observes that Congress in
1933 imposed stringent duties only
on sellers engaging in public offerings, interfering as little as possible
with private business transactions.
Thus, the Gustafson Group argues
that Section 12(2) should not reach
the type of transaction involved in
this case - a privately negotiated
sale of stock to experienced,
sophisticated buyers. Second, the
Gustafson Group contends that a
broad construction of Section 12(2)
is unnecessary in view of the even
more expansive protection that
buyers enjoy under Rule 10b-5 and
Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b). Finally, the Gustafson
Group maintains that extending the
remedy of Section 12(2) to privately negotiated transactions would
interfere with the ability of private
persons to place limits on their bargains, would add to the cost of private transactions, and would
increase litigation in federal courts.
Wind Point and Holdings counter
by arguing that none of these policy
arguments demonstrates that
applying Section 12(2) to private
transactions is beyond the scope of
what a rational Congress could possibly have intended. They argue
that congressional sensitivity
toward private business transactions was reflected in the registration and prospectus delivery
requirements of the 1933 Act, but
not in the Act's civil liability provisions. As to the possibility of rendering superfluous Rule 10b-5 by
expanding protection under Section
12(2) to all buyers, Wind Point and
Holdings observe that the
Gustafson Group's argument
ignores the important substantive
differences between the two remedies, and also overlooks the obvious
fact that "it is hardly a novel proposition that the Securities Exchange
(Continued on page 99)
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Act and the Securities Act 'prohibit
some of the same conduct."'
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375 (1983). And, in
response to the contention that a
narrow construction of Section
12(2) will reduce transaction costs
and litigation, Wind Point and
Holdings assert that a policy requiring a party to tell the truth is not
antiefficient or antibusiness. Finally,
Wind Point and Holdings argue that
affirming the Seventh Circuit in this
case would merely maintain the status quo of case law that for 50 years
has permitted any sophisticated
party represented by competent
counsel to use Section 12(2) to
rescind, i.e., to cancel, a privately
negotiated securities transaction
because of a seller's material omission or misrepresentation.
SIGNIFICANCE
Section 12(2) offers important
benefits to defrauded buyers in private securities transactions that are
unavailable under the all-purpose
antifraud remedy found in Rule
10b-5. Under Section 12(2), a buyer
can recover for negligent misstatements or omissions, while the seller
must prove that he or she acted with
due care. Under Rule 10b-5, however, a buyer must establish that the
seller actually knew that the communication was inaccurate. In addition, a buyer under Section 12(2)
need not prove that he or she relied
upon a misstatement or omission in
making a purchase. Finally, unlike
buyers proceeding under Rule 10b-5
who must bring suit in federal court,
Section 12(2) buyers may sue either
in state or federal court.
The Supreme Court's decision in
Gustafson will determine whether
all securities buyers will enjoy these
advantages. The outcome takes on
even greater meaning for investors
in view of decisions by the Court
during the past 20 years that have
significantly weakened both Section

12, Pinter,486 U.S. at 647, and Rule
10b-5, Central Bank of Denver,N A.
v. FirstInterstateBank of Denver,
N.A., 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994); Lampf,
Pleva,Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975).
ARGUMENTS
For Arthur L. Gustafson (Counsel
of Record: Donald W. Jenkins;
Vedder, Price, Kaufman &
Kammholz; 222 North LaSalle
Street, Chicago, IL 60601; (312)
609-7500) and for Daniel R. McLean
and Francis I. Butler (Counsel of
Record: Harold C. Wheeler; Seyfarth,
Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson;
55 East Monroe Street, Chicago, IL
60603; (312) 346-8000):
1. The language and structure of the
1933 Act demonstrate that Section
12(2) applies to public, not private,
sales of securities.
2. The 1933 Act was intended to
interfere as little as possible with
private business. Section 12(2) is an
unusually powerful remedy that has
no proper place in a privately negotiated transaction.

AMICUS BRIEFS
In support of Arthur L. Gustafson,
Daniel R. McLean, and Francis
I. Butler
Securities Industry Association,
Inc. (Counsel of Record: Robert L.
Schnell; Faegre & Benson; 2200
Norwest Center, 90 South 7th
Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402;
(612) 336-3000).
In support of Alloyd Company, Inc.
and Wind Point Partners II, L.P.
The National Association of
Securities and Commercial Law
Attorneys (Counsel of Record:
Patrick E. Cafferty; Miller Faucher
Chertow Cafferty and Wexler; 30
North LaSalle Street, Suite 3200,
Chicago, IL 60602; (312) 782-4880);
North American Securities
Administrators Association, Inc.
(Counsel of Record: Karen M.
O'Brien, General Counsel; North
American Securities Administrators
Association, Inc.; One Massachusetts
Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20001;
(202) 737-0900);
Securities and Exchange
Commission (Drew S. Days, III,
Solicitor General; Department of
Justice, Washington, DC 20530;
(202) 514-2217).

For Alloyd Company, Inc. and Wind
Point Partners II, L.P. (Counsel of
Record: Robert J. Kopecky; Kirkland
& Ellis; 200 East Randolph Drive,
Chicago, IL 60601; (312) 861-2000):
1. The language and structure of the
1933 Act demonstrate that Section
12(2) applies to both public and private sales of securities.
2. Application of Section 12(2) to
private transactions is consistent
with the broad remedial purpose of
the 1933 Act. The interests of the
purchaser in having truthful information about the securities is the
same in either a private or public
transaction.
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